Abstract-As the Internet of Things (IOT) arises, the use of low-end devices on a daily basis increases. The wireless nature of communication that these devices provide raises security and privacy issues. For protecting a user's privacy, cryptography offers the tool of zero knowledge proofs (ZKP). In this paper, we study well-established ZKP protocols based on the discrete logarithm problem and we adapt them to the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) setting, which consists an ideal candidate for embedded implementations. Then, we implement the proposed protocols on Wiselib, a generic and open source algorithmic library. For the first time, we present a thorough evaluation of the protocols on two popular hardware platforms equipped with low end microcontrollers (Jennic JN5139, TI MSP430) and 802.15.4 RF transceivers, in terms of code size, execution time, message size and energy requirements. This work's results can be used from developers who wish to achieve certain levels of privacy in their applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in wireless communications and microelectro systems have lead to the construction of tiny devices with processing and communication capabilities. Mobile phones, PDAs, sensor devices and RFID tags are becoming part of our daily lives and their networked interconnection makes the vision of the IOT a real situation. Smart towns and buildings, automated hospitals, intelligent cars and sensors embedded in clothes are concepts that are being developed.
However, the wireless nature of communication that these devices provide (e.g. 802.11, 802.15.4, Bluetooth) raises significant security and trust issues. In many cases, these petit computers may need to exchange crucial information that needs to remain private. A cryptographic tool that can be used for protecting user's privacy is zero knowledge proofs (ZKP).
A ZKP involves two entities, a prover and a verifier. It allows the prover to demonstrate knowledge of a secret while revealing no information whatsoever of use to the verifier in conveying this demonstration of knowledge to others [9] . In this paper, we focus on the study of well-established ZKP based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Up to now, although a wide variety of ZKP of this category has been proposed [11] no actual implementations regarding resource constrained devices have been presented. For this reason and regarding privacy issues on the IOT, we concentrate on the application of ZKP for the security and privacy empowerment of current wireless networks consisting of low constrained devices.
Nevertheless, when considering low-end devices capable of communicating wirelessly one should take into account the resource limitations, i.e. the restricted processing power, memory and energy as well as the particularities imposed by the low-power wireless communication protocols (e.g. packet loss, channel throughput, message size). Thus, in this work we emphasize on the ECC approach, as proposed in previous works [12] , [4] , with the implementation of ZKP on constrained devices as our main objective.
Our Contributions: Firstly, we show how wellestablished ZKP based on the DLP can be adapted to the Elliptic Curve DLP (ECDLP). Such an adaptation consists the key for implementing ZKP on embedded devices because of the advantages that ECC offers. Secondly, we implement the new proposed protocols on Wiselib, a generic, highly portable and open source algorithmic library. Finally, for the first time we present a thorough evaluation of the implemented protocols on two popular hardware platforms equipped with widely used low-end microcontrollers (Jennic JN5139, TI MSP430) as well as 802.15.4 RF transceivers in terms of execution time, code size, messages' size and energy consumption. We experimentally prove that our protocols have small code footprint (around 8Kb) and that their exchanged messages fit well in the technical specifications of the 802.15.4 protocol.
Paper Outline: Firstly, in Section II we show how ZKP based on the DLP can be adapted to ECDLP. In Section III we refer to the Wiselib platform, the hardware used for our experiments and we present an evaluation of the protocols on actual constrained devices. In Section IV we describe an everyday application where ZKP can be used. Finally, in Section V we conclude and propose our ideas for future work.
II. ZERO KNOWLEDGE PROTOCOLS BASED ON THE ECDLP
The DLP is defined over arbitrary cyclic groups. A common example of cyclic groups are elliptic curve groups which are defined over an additive group F of order n. The DLP over elliptic curve groups is called ECDLP and can be defined as follows: Given an elliptic curve E over a field F of order n (referred to as F n from now on), a generator point G ∈ E/F n and a point B ∈ E/F n , it is computationally hard to find x ∈ F n such that B = x · G.
A. Schnorr's Protocol
One of the first ZKP protocols was originally presented in [10] . The elliptic curve version of Schnorr's protocol, slightly modified, is the following: Prover (PRV) and Verifier (VER) agree on an elliptic curve E over a field F n , a generator point G ∈ E/F n . They both know B ∈ E/F n and PRV claims he knows x ∈ F n such that B = x · G. He wants to prove this fact to VER without revealing x.
Protocol Steps:
• PRV generates random r ∈ F n and computes the point A = r · G • PRV sends the point A to VER • VER computes c = HASH(G, B, A, l) where l a random seed and sends c to PRV • PRV computes m = r + c · x (mod n) and sends m to VER
In this protocol, VER uses a hash function known only to him. A dishonest PRV has a tiny chance of cheating as he would have to fix the value of P = m·G−c·B before receiving VER's hash value c. Under the assumption that the hash function used by the VER is secure, a PRV who does not know x, the discrete logarithm of B, cannot cheat.
B. Transforming Schnorr's Protocol to Digital Signature
In [3] , the authors proposed that with the use of a hash function and an agreement on an initial message m one can remove the interactivity from such protocols. VER's random challenge can be replaced with bits produced by a secure hash function. Thus, the next protocol is proposed.
PRV and VER agree on an elliptic curve E over a field F n , a generator point G ∈ E/F n , a point P ∈ E/F n that represents the message the PRV wants to send and a hash function HASH(). They both know B ∈ E/F n . PRV claims that he knows x ∈ F n such that B = x · G and he wishes to prove this fact to VER without revealing x.
• PRV generates random r ∈ F n and computes the point
• PRV sends to VER the message: "s||x · P ||r · P ||r · G"
Why it works: In this protocol we apply the non interactiveness trick proposed by Fiat and Shamir. PRV simulates both the PRV and the VER with the use of a hash function and publishes the transcript of this whole dialogue. This way PRV sends only one message and VER either accepts or rejects. PRV generates a random number as in previous protocols but VER's random choices are simulated by hashing the input along with a value calculated from PRV's choice of r. Thus, VER's random choice depends on PRV's random choice and it is made hard to fake the outcome. The value c is really a challenge for PRV as it is computed from the hash function and it is out of his control. If PRV does not know x, in order to cheat he would try to find s satisfying s · G = r · G + c · x · G which is an instance of the discrete logarithm problem. He could not cheat by enumerating random r values, as it would be too hard to find a matching value for c.
C. Zero Knowledge Test of Discrete Logarithm Equality
Suppose that PRV knows two publically known quantities that have the same discrete logarithm x to publicly known respective bases G and H of the elliptic curve.
PRV and VER agree on an elliptic curve E over a field F n and two generator points G, H ∈ E/F n . PRV claims he knows x ∈ F n such that B = x · G and C = x · H and wants to prove knowledge of this fact without revaling x. The procedure was originally proposed in [2] , and its ECC analogous is as follows:
• PRV chooses random r ∈ F n and computes the points K = r · G and L = r · H • PRV sends the points K, L to VER • VER chooses random c ∈ F n and sends c to PRV
Why it works: In this protocol PRV claims he knows x as the discrete logarithm of two public quantities B, C. His actions are similar with Schnorr's protocol but for the two public quantities. For example, in the first step he computes 2 points on the curve K, L that will be used for the verification.
D. Zero Knowledge Proof of Single Bit
PRV and VER agree on an elliptic curve E over a field F n and two generator points G, H ∈ E/F n . PRV knows x and h such that B = x · G + h · H, where x ∈ F n and h = ±1. He wishes to convince VER that he really does know x and that h really is ±1 without revealing x nor the sign bit [11] .
• PRV sends the points A, C to VER • VER generates random c ∈ F n and sends c to PRV • PRV computes e = c−d and t = w+x·e both (mod n)
and that t · G = C + e · (B − H) Why it works: It is straightforward to confirm that if B is really given by one of the two formulas PRV claimed then VER's verification will succeed. It is also easy to see that PRV does not give away any information that would allow VER to deduce x nor the sign bit h. That is because x is hidden inside t after being multiplied with e and added in w. The sign bit h is randomized with the appropriate swaps in the case of −1.
III. PROTOCOLS IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION A. Wiselib: A Generic Algorithm Library for Sensor Networks
We decided to implement the proposed protocols using Wiselib [1] : a code library, that allows implementations to be OS-independent. It is implemented based on C++ and templates, but without virtual inheritance and exceptions. Algorithm implementations can be recompiled for several platforms and firmwares, without the need to change the code. Wiselib can interface with systems implemented using C (Contiki), C++ (iSense), and nesC (TinyOS). A future plan for this library is to be adapted for C-based mobile phone operating systems like Android and iPhone OS.
Wiselib runs on the simulators Shawn [5] and Tossim [6] , hereby easing the transition from simulation to actual devices. This Wiselib feature allows us to validate the faithfulness of our implementation and also get results concerning the quality of our algorithms without time consuming deployment procedures and harsh debugging environments.
Finally, an advantage of Wiselib is that with the aid of template specializations the algorithm code can be optimized and adapted for certain platforms. Depending on the compilation process, the compiler can select the code that fits best for the current platform (e.g. if there is a 32-bit processor) and exploit the presence of special platform hardware (e.g. the Jennic AES hardware for speedup of crypto routines).
B. Hardware
For evaluating the implemented protocols we used Coalesenses iSense devices and Crossbow TelosB motes. This hardware is quite popular for its application in the area of wireless sensor networks.
The iSense device consists of a Jennic JN5139 32-bit RISC controller running at 16MHz. The ROM of this controller is 192Kb and its RAM is 96Kb that can be shared among program and data. It is equipped with 2.4Ghz IEEE 802.15.4 compliant RF transceiver (CC2420 chip) that can achieve bandwith up to 250 Kbps. Finally, this device runs the iSense firmware.
The TelosB device consists of a Texas Instruments MSP430 16-bit microcontroller running at 8MHz. Its RAM is 10Kb and the program flash memory is 48Kb. This device is also equipped with 2.4GHz IEEE 802.15.4 compliant RF transceiver (CC2420 chip) able to achieve data rates up to 250Kbps. Finally, the TelosB device can run TinyOs 1.1.10 (or higher) or the Contiky operating system.
C. Results
For the basic operations of ECC we have ported the implementation of [8] on the Wiselib. This implementation defines a recommended elliptic curve over binary fields with equation y 2 + xy = x 3 + x 2 + 1 along with the irreducible polynomial f (x) = x 163 +x 7 +x 6 +x 3 +1. The curve's order is r = 0x4000000000000000000020108a2e0cc0d99f 8a5ef and the base (generator) point is G(x, y) where x = 0x2f e13c0537bbc11acaa07d793de4e6d5e5c94eee8 and y = 0x289070f b05d38f f 58321f 2e800536d538ccdaa3d9. The execution time of the basic elliptic curve and arithmetic operations for both the microprocessors used can be seen on Table I . We note that there has been no attempt to optimize the code responsible for the elliptic curve operations. As a hash function for the protocols that require one we used the algorithm SHA-1.
For all the arithmetic operations, we present a theoretical approach for estimating their energy consumption. This approach is based on the current consumption that the data sheet of each microprocessor provides us. For example, from the JN5139 data sheet we get that the current consumption of the mote when the microprocessor works on maximum load is 12.7mA, on input voltage 3V and temperature 25
• C. The input voltage 3V is a reasonable choice considering the fact that two AA batteries provide that much voltage. Respectively, the MSP430 microcontroller draws approximately 1.8mA current when it operates. Thus, considering the Formula
where V is voltage, I is current and t is time and the execution time of each operation, we show on Table I our estimation for each operation's energy consumption.
From these experiments, a reader can observe that the elliptic curve scalar multiplication (Public Key Generation) is the most demanding operation in terms of execution time and energy consumption. Moreover, it is also evident that the JN5139 (16MHz) calculates much faster all the operations examined than the MSP430 (8MHz). We believe that a delay of 11 sec for the generation of a public key is acceptable. On the other hand, the 58 sec that are required from the MSP430 is probably too long. Finally, it is interesting to note that the JN5139 processor, although it is much faster in computation than the MSP430, it is less efficient in terms of energy consumption.
Next, on Table II we have concentrated PRV's and VER's actions for each protocol and on Table III one can see each protocol's total execution time. This is measured as the time space between PRV's beginning of the protocol until the VER's final response of whether he accepts or rejects the proof. Table IV describes the messages exchanged by PRV and VER during each protocol. All protocol messages (except Schnorr's signature message) fit well in an 802.15.4 packet (128 bytes).
It is quite difficult to estimate the energy consumption of RF messages as they depend on various factors like motes distance, obstacles presence and weather conditions. However, we try to make a theoritical estimation about it. Under the ideal hypothesis that the devices' RF transceivers achieve data rate 250 Kbps and according to Table IV we calculate the time required to send each message depending on its size (e.g. with data rate 250 Kbps a message of size 85 bytes needs around 2.72 msec for transmission/reception). Next, we estimate the energy consumption for sending and receiving the messages on each device using the Formula 1. From the iSense data sheet we get that the Rx current consumption on input voltage 3V and temperature 25
• C is 43.7 mA and the Tx current consumption is 39.9 mA. Respectively, from the TelosB data sheet we get that Rx current consumption is 23mA and that Tx current consumption is 21mA. Table V summarizes the results.  Considering the Tables I, II , V we estimate the total energy consumption for PRV and VER of each protocol depending on its actions (arithmetic operations and messages sent/received). Table VI shows the results. We observe that the protocols execution consumes less energy on the TelosB device with the slower processor. As a last experiment, we measured the code size of the above protocols on the devices used. The compiled code actually fits fairly well (approximately 8Kb) on the tiny memory of their processors (Table VI) . The difference in the protocols code size on the two devices is reasonable as different compilers (ba-elf for iSense and mspgcc for TelosB) are employed. 
D. Discussion
First of all, we state why implementing ZKP protocols under the ECC setting is advantageous. As widely known, ECC offers the same level of security as other public key cryptosystems, using smaller key sizes. An implementation of DLP ZKP over multiplicative groups would require the use of at least 1024-bit keys as proposed by NIST. A reader can realize that using elliptic curve groups instead of multiplicative groups, the arithmetic operations need less time to execute, less memory space and thus less energy consumption. In fact, it has been proven that ECC actually outperforms RSA on constrained environments in terms of computation time, memory requirements and thus energy consumption [4] . Moreover, ECC offers the advantage of smaller message sizes that cost less and have better chances of being delivered.
A second point for discussion is the comparison between Schnorr's and Schnorr's signature protocol. By transforming Schnorr's protocol to a non-interactive protocol, the required message exchanges are reduced (1 message required by PRV and VER). However, the transformed protocol is not as efficient as Schnorr's original protocol in terms of execution time, energy consumption, code size and message size. Schnorr's interactive protocol required 33 sec on the JN5139 microcontroller, which is quite fair considering the processing power and the memory of the device used.
As far as the efficiency of the elliptic curve arithmetic operations of our implementation is concerned, we have already mentioned that we did not make any attempts to optimize the code. One can easily observe that the scalar multiplication, needs the most time to execute (11 sec on JN5139, 58 sec on MSP430). Subsequently, this operation requires the most energy for its execution. We believe that this is the price you pay when you write some generic code which can be portable. Although, Wiselib offers the chance to compile your code exploiting some platform features (a 32-bit processor or hardware speedups) we aimed at generality and portability. The goal of this work was not to achieve some faster platform specific code (e.g. by employing low-level assembly code) as in [4] , [7] . However, we think that for such low-end microprocessors running at 16 MHz or 8MHz the total execution time of our protocols is reasonable. For example, 33 sec on a 16MHz microcontroller for a secure verification is not too much to wait. Having implemented our protocols in Wiselib, with little effort we can port our code on C-based operating systems for mobile phones like Android and iPhone OS where the embedded hardware is much more powerful. For instance, we note that a current HTC mobile phone is powered by an 1 GHz ARMv7 Snapdragon processor with 512 MB of flash and 576 MB of RAM. Of course, our code would execute much faster on such a platform. Nevertheless, running and evaluating it on really low-end devices was much more meaningful.
Considering memory limitations, we showed that the protocols' compiled code actually fits well on the restricted memory of the devices used. For the iSense devices the protocols code occupied approximately 9Kb out of the total 96Kb of memory that is offered. Respectively, the protocols code on the TelosB devices, occupied approximately 8Kb out of the total flash memory of 48Kb.
Considering messages' size, most of them are 43 or 85 bytes which can fit on a single 802.15.4 packet (max payload 128 bytes). Only, the Prover's message from Schnorr's signature protocol was large enough (149 bytes) and had to be broken in two pieces. However, by recompiling each device's firmware, which is a straightforward procedure, one could increase the maximum payload size and such a message could fit in a single packet. Such a solution though, would be non-standard. The reasonable message sizes are due to the ECC approach. A reader can realize that using another cryptosystem (e.g. with 1024-bit keys) would result in bigger messages that would require fragmentation. This way many messages would need to be exchanged and more energy would be consumed. Additionally, the possibility of communication faults would increase as the wireless medium could be congested.
Finally, a point for discussion, is the fact that in our protocols we preload the elliptic curve used and its parameters on the devices memory. This way, the elliptic curve and its parameters could be compromised by physical and tampering attacks. However, we believe that in the future, most devices will be equipped with Trusted Platform Module (TPM), secure cryptoprocessors suitable for storing cryptographic keys and protecting private information.
IV. AN APPLICATION SCENARIO
As an example, we show how the protocol Zero Knowledge Proof of Single Bit can be used in an everyday IOT application. This protocol proves the possesion of a discrete logarithm without revealing it and additionally proves that a value has been added or substracted to the corresponding public key without revealing which operation took place.
As cities get more and more intelligent, the concept of smart parking is widely spread. Ultra low power wireless mesh networks with web-based suites of parking management applications are deployed in order to provide real time parking occupancy status, charging fees and other useful information. A typical smart parking scenario allows citizens to park without charge at the spaces of their neigborhood. However, such an application could raise important privacy issues as an attacker could extract from the network private information about the citizens (e.g. Mr. Smith has just arrived home). We propose a scenario that protects citizen's privacy.
In this scenario, we assume that there exists a parking space between every two major streets inside a city. Each citizen gets a device containing a private key that encodes his attributes (name and vehicle registration plate) from the local goverment. The private key is used to generate a public key that proves his validity as a citizen. Moreover, depending on his address, a value that encodes the specific neighborhood parking space (which should be free only for those who live on one of the two corresponding streets) is added to or substracted from his public key. The authority digitally signs the new public key and then places this device on the citizen's vehicle.
Parking spaces are equipped with devices placed on their entrances. Thus, when a citizen wants to park in his neigborhood parking space, his device communicates with that on the parking entrance and proves two things: first that this vehicle belongs to a valid citizen and second that this citizen lives on one of the two neigborhood streets (without revealing which) and is able to park without charge. This proof is done by presenting a public key signed from the local goverment (the reader is aware of the trusted authority's public key), by proving that it actually holds the private key that generated the citizen validity public key and by proving that the specific parking value has been added to or substracted from the public key. If the proof is successful, the parking entrance bar is lifted and the vehicle is allowed to enter the parking. Another citizen's vehicle that is not eligible to park in that space (the parking value has not been added or substracted) is requested to pay the appropriate fee in order to enter the parking space and a vehicle that is not registered at all to the local goverment is not allowed to enter the parking. A malicious user who eavesdrops the proof cannot extract any information that could be useful to him (e.g. in order to get free parking space or monitor a citizen's actions).
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we considered the problem of implementing ZKP in low-end devices regarding privacy issues on the IOT. Considering the resource limitations of such devices as well as the restrictions imposed by low power wireless communication protocols, we applied the ECC approach.
For the first time, we present an implementation of ZKP protocols in an open source and generic programming library called Wiselib. Our code is highly portable, freely available and ready to use. Based on our implementations, we conducted a thorough evaluation of the protocols on two hardware platforms equipped with widely used low-end microcontrollers (Jennic JN5139, TI MSP430) as well as 802.15.4 RF transceivers.
Future work includes the expansion of the library presented in this paper so as to include ZKP protocols which prove various relations for the hidden values (e.g. range proofs, membership proofs).
